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ABSTRACT: 
 
 
 
Incidents of sexual violence continue to be a serious problem for society. Likewise, acts of 
sexual violence impose severe consequences for survivors. The consequences initially begin at 
the onset of the survivor’s journey to psychological recovery following the traumatic sexual 
assault. The consequences take on a unique set of characteristics when the survivor attempts to 
use the justice system to confront the perpetrator who committed the offense. These 
characteristics can transform an adversarial process into an isolated battle for the survivor. In the 
worst cases, the justice system empowers individuals who wish to silence survivors with free 
speech restrictions instead of empowering survivors of sexual violence. 
 
 When confronting an alleged perpetrator of sexual violence, survivors may have to 
contend with free speech restrictions that can come from school officials, police officers, and 
perpetrators. These restrictions can force survivors into situations where they have no choice but 
to cheer for their perpetrator because of their position as a cheerleader. These restrictions may 
result in the false imprisonment of survivors if police officers believe they have fabricated the 
elements of their interaction with the alleged perpetrator. These restrictions may result in alleged 
perpetrators maliciously using defamation laws to restrict the free speech of survivors.  At each 
level, these restrictions can silence survivors of sexual violence and contribute to the lack of 
sexual assault reporting. 
 
 The legal issues found within these restrictions lead to a discussion that attempts to 
resolve the malicious and unjustifiable resources that individuals may use to restrict survivors of 
sexual violence. These resources include constitutional law, criminal law, and civil law. First, the 
use of free speech restrictions in schools must be inextricably linked to a legitimate pedagogical 
reason.  Next, law enforcement agencies holding the responsibility of investigating acts of sexual 
violence must employ investigative methods that are conducive to an environment that is 
supportive of survivors.  Lastly, alleged perpetrators attempting to bring a defamation action 
against a survivor must be held accountable if they attempt to coerce a survivor into mediating a 
claim by disclosing personal information about them.  Above all, free speech restrictions must be 
clearly justified to subvert its tendency to silence survivors of sexual violence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Survivors1 of sexual violence face an arduous journey after being subjected to sexual 
violence. During this journey, survivors have to contend with the trauma of the sexual assault 
while struggling to reclaim their life in a society that may disapprove of their actions prior to and 
during the assault. In the worst of these cases, the disapproval can lead to a high level of scrutiny 
that may result in legal consequences for survivors. The high level of scrutiny can come from 
school officials, investigating police officers, courts, and perpetrators of sexual violence. As a 
result of that scrutiny, survivors can have their free speech restricted by school officials, suffer 
arrest from police officers, incarceration by judges, and defamation claims from individuals they 
allege to have sexually assaulted them. At each level, these legal consequences have a tendency 
to chill the free speech of survivors, which ultimately silences their freedom to speak out against 
their attacker. 
Beyond the chilling effect, these restrictions can come at a time when a survivor is trying 
to recover from physical and psychological consequences of the sexual assault. As a result of 
these restrictions, survivors could potentially experience a series of adverse situations when 
confronting their assailant in the justice system. Furthermore, these situations are a consequence 
of the misuse of constitutional law, criminal law, and civil law. The misuse of these laws can be 
attributed to a justice system that inadequately prepares school officials, police officers, defense 
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges who are responsible for resolving these types of offenses. For 
example, this insufficient preparation can result in overbearing police officers, overzealous 
                                                
1 The term “Survivor” is used to represent all victims of sexual violence throughout this paper. 
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defense attorneys, and prosecutors who fail to convict the alleged perpetrator.2 When these 
failures occur, the recovery process for a survivor can be impeded by the legal consequences of 
reporting sexual violence. 
In the end, this note argues that the justice system contains three areas of law that actively 
and passively contributes to failures in reporting acts of sexual violence. For example, school 
officials can use constitutional law to restrict a student’s free speech, law enforcement officers 
can use criminal law to punish citizens, and alleged perpetrators can use the civil justice systems 
to bring defamation claims against citizens. The use of these laws ultimately impacts survivors of 
sexual violence by subjecting them to free speech restrictions, tort liability, and in the worst 
cases, incarceration. This all occurs without providing survivors with the right to freely confront 
the individual they allege to be the one who perpetrated sexual violence against them. Above all, 
survivors of sexual violence will not be able to seek the necessary treatment to appropriately 
cope with the assault if they cannot discuss the act of sexual violence. (Part I and II) 
The first area of law begins with constitutional law and occurs in institutions of 
education. Instances of sexual violence have a unique impact on survivors while they are in an 
educational environment. In these particular cases, the act of sexual violence may not occur 
under the authority of school officials, but the subsequent consequence of the sexual assault 
affects the survivor once they return to school activities. Once a survivor returns to an 
educational environment, they may find their right to confront the alleged perpetrator restricted 
by school officials. Although the First Amendment protects against certain restrictions, school 
officials are allowed to obstruct the free speech of a survivor if it invokes a substantial disruption 
to the school’s work. Although school officials retain the right to restrict certain student acts, 
                                                
2 David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1195 (1997). 
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they must only restrict them if there is an actual disruption to a pedagogical activity. Likewise, 
school officials should formulate a structured plan that empowers survivors once they return to 
an educational environment. Following this method would increase the likelihood of survivors 
reporting the offense, curb the cycle of sexual violence, and contribute to a healthy recovery for 
the survivor (Part III). 
Although survivors may have their speech restricted through the use of constitutional 
law, they can have their liberty revoked through the use of criminal law. Survivors of sexual 
violence can be met with hostility when they decide to report the offense to the police.3 The basis 
for this hostility is rooted in myths related to the characteristics of the sexual assault. Moreover, 
these myths may influence the investigating officer’s treatment of the survivor as well as the 
survivor’s account of the offense. If the investigating officer believes the survivor has fabricated 
the offense, they retain the authority to arrest and charge the survivor with falsely reporting a 
crime. Although this is a necessary practice, this method is overly used in sexual assault 
investigations, which can erode public trust and severely damage and silence survivors. Law 
enforcement agencies have minimized these damaging situations by applying investigative 
policies that support survivors of sexual violence. In addition, applying these investigative 
guidelines will reduce the amount of unnecessary trauma survivors are subjected to during 
investigative interviews. Above all, employing these guidelines across police departments would 
increase public trust and a survivor’s willingness to report the offense to law enforcement (Part 
IV).   
While survivors can have their speech restricted through the use of constitutional law and 
their liberty revoked through criminal law, they can also be held liable for their allegations 
                                                
3 Anderson, supra note 7, at 932 (Anderson underscores the idea that the police may persuade the victim 
to withdraw the complaint by highlighting the likelihood of a grueling cross-examination from the 
defense and an unsuccessful trial). 
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through defamation claims. When survivors of sexual violence become defendants in defamation 
claims, several issues arise. The first issue is a result of the limited resources survivors have to 
establish an adequate defense. Next, complainants can overtly use defamation claims as a means 
to intimidate, control, and coerce the survivor into recanting their allegations. Furthermore, if the 
survivor has the necessary resources to wage an adequate defense, they are unable to protect their 
sexual history from disclosure. Lastly, survivors of sexual violence are often unable to hold the 
complainant to a higher burden of proof because courts find them to be private plaintiffs as 
opposed to public officials. Therefore, survivors of sexual violence need increased protection and 
adequate defenses when defending their allegation of sexual violence in a defamation case (Part 
V). 
The malicious and unjustified use of constitutional law, criminal law, and civil law can 
discourage survivors from reporting sexual violence. The failure to report these acts can impede 
the recovery of a survivor and ultimately empower perpetrators of sexual violence by failing to 
hold them accountable. To reduce these damaging situations, society must redefine the way it 
responds to survivors of sexual violence. First, school officials must redefine a substantial 
disruption and create plans that empower survivors once they return to the educational 
environment. Next, police departments should educate law enforcement officers regarding the 
dynamics of sexual violence, they must adopt policies that empower survivors through the 
investigative process, and if the individual is believed to have fabricated an allegation of sexual 
violence, the department should use alternatives to prosecution like restorative justice. Lastly, 
defendants in defamation cases should be shielded from having their privacy arbitrarily exposed 
and complainants should be held to a higher burden of proof if they have been previously 
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. Implementing these legal changes can ultimately 
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contribute to the recovery of a survivor by giving them the opportunity to discuss the act of 
sexual violence without consequences (Part VI).  
II. THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND THE FAILURE TO REPORT 
 
Acts of sexual violence continues to be serious criminal, public health, economic, and 
social issue for survivors and their supporters. This continues to be a critical issue because recent 
information suggests that 17.6% of adult women experiencing a completed or attempted sexual 
assault during their lifetime.4 Equally important, the impact of sexual violence does not stop after 
the assault because survivors experience physical and emotional injuries that have long-standing 
consequences.5 These long-standing consequences regularly come in the form of a psychological 
injury.6 This psychological injury is commonly defined as Rape Trauma Syndrome, which is a 
culmination of a survivor’s experience of extreme grief, anger, drowsiness or exhaustion, 
physical symptoms, nightmares, phobias, and general emotional retreat.7 While dealing with the 
physical and emotional consequences of the sexual assault, survivors often return to the scene of 
the crime, fell little emotion, and refuse or are hesitant to press charges against the alleged 
perpetrator.8 While survivors deal with these substantial physical and emotional issues, they may 
also face legal consequences that are deeply rooted in rape myths. 
While survivors battle the physical and emotion pain associated with sexual violence, 
they also have to contend with a society that has embraced myths surrounding sexual violence. 
                                                
4 Marjorie R. Sable, Fran Danis, Denise L. Mauzy, & Sarah K. Gallagher, Barriers to Reporting Sexual 
Assault for Women and Men: Perspectives of College Students, 55 J. AM. C. HEALTH 157-162 (2006). 
5 Sarah M. Guerette & Sandra Caron, Assessing the Impact of Acquaintance Rape: Interviews with 
Women Who Are Victims/Survivors of Sexual Assault While in College, 22 J. C. STUD. PSYCOL. 31, 32 
(2007). 
6 Michelle J. Anderson, Women do not Report the Violence they Suffer: Violence Against Women and the 
State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 922 (2001). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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Sexual assault myths can work to cloud a survivor’s judgment and perception of institutional 
reactions to the sexual assault they experienced. These reactions can lead survivors to the 
conclusion that they will not be taken seriously, may become the target for blame, and may face 
wrath from the abuser, family, or friends if they report the offense.9 These thoughts are a result 
of stereotypes related to sexual violence, which hold that the suspect must be a stranger, a 
weapon and violence must have occurred, the survivor must have been hysterical and 
immediately reported the event, there must be signs of physical injury, the survivor must not 
have exercised bad judgment at the time of the assault, the survivor has never reported a sexual 
assault in the past, and the suspect was described as sick, crazy, or deranged, not respectable, 
credible, or likeable.10 These stereotypes influence failures in reporting because the justice 
system can be skeptical of the survivor if the characteristics of their victimization do not fit into 
the aforementioned narrow framework. 
Beyond these problems, survivors can find themselves blamed for the sexual assault 
because they somehow failed to recognize the predatory behavior of the assailant. This shift of 
blame can influence the survivor’s decision to cooperate with the investigation or report future 
acts of sexual violence in the future.11 Above all, this issue of reporting contributes to the 
percentage of survivors who do not report crimes against them, a number that is already 
estimated to be between 64% and 96%.12 Further, only 2% of all violence against women is 
                                                
9 Rosemary Gartner & Ross Macmillan, The Effect of Victim-Offender Relationship on Reporting Crimes 
of Violence Against Women, 37 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 393 (1995).  
10 Kimberly A. Lonsway, Joanne Archambault, & David Lisak, False Reports: Moving Beyond the Issue 
to Successfully Investigate and Prosecute Non-Stranger Sexual Assault, 43 MAR PROSC10 (2009).   
11 Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and their Children: Lessons from one Woman’s Story, 35 HOUS. L. 
REV. 29, 91 (1998). 
12 David Lisak, Lori Gardinier, Sarah C. Nicksa, & Ashley M. Cote, False Allegations of Sexual Assault: 
An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases, Violence Against Women, 16(12) 1318-1334, 1331 (2010). 
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reported on college campuses.13 Some of the reported reasons for not reporting sexual violence 
include the breach of their privacy, loss of possessions and social status, increased financial 
obligations, increases in family tension and stress, and the possibility of retaliatory violence.14 
Despite these issues, survivors of sexual violence can often feel powerless about their situation 
and misperceive that the offense is their fault.15 Imposing the type of restrictions that have been 
recently imposed on survivors does not increase the likelihood that they will discuss acts of 
sexual violence in order to obtain treatment or justice. This lack of reporting reinforces the 
behavior of perpetrators of sexual violence by allowing them to commit these acts without 
detection or intervention. Most notable, is the fact that failures in reporting can result in 
additional acts of sexual violence. 
If a survivor decides to report an act of sexual violence, the justice system can respond in 
a way that can disrupt their ability to properly cope with the trauma associated with sexual 
violence. This response can occur through three areas of law. First, school officials can use the 
constitution to restrict the free speech of survivors in institutions of education. Second, law 
enforcement officers can use criminal law to punish survivors if they suspect that they have 
fabricated the allegation of sexual violence. Third, alleged perpetrators can use defamation laws 
to recover damages if they contend that the survivor has subjected them to false speech. When 
these laws are abused and inappropriately used, they can damage and silence true survivors of 
sexual violence.  
                                                
13 Martie Thompson, Dylan Sitterle, George Clay, & Jeffrey Kingree, Reasons for Not Reporting 
Victimizations to the Police: Do they vary for Physical and Sexual Incidents, 55 J. AM. COLL. HEALTH 
277-282 (2007). 
14 Caroline Akers & Catherine Kaukinen, The Police Reporting Behavior of Intimate Partner Violence 
Victims, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 159 (2009) 
15 Mary Oschwald, Mary Ann Curry, Rosemary B. Hughes, Anne Arthur, & Laurie E. Powers, Law 
enforcement’s Response to Crime Reporting by People with Disabilities, 12 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 527 
(2011). 
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III. SCHOOLS, STUDENT SPEECH, AND SURVIVORS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
 
The Landscape of Free Speech in Schools 
 
Legal issues involving free speech saturate schools and universities, leading to academic 
discussions surrounding the justification for restricting students’ speech. The landscape of free 
speech has changed since the Supreme Court affirmed the notion that schools should be 
institutions that teach students to be freethinking-citizens of a democracy.16 Moreover, content-
based speech regulations of student speech essentially represent thought control and official 
censorship, which is exactly what the First Amendment prohibits.17 Despite these declarations, 
the government routinely imposes speech restrictions within the rules and curriculum of public 
schools and universities, in laws and policies affecting government-employee speech, in 
government speech subsidies, in radio and television regulations, in commercial speech 
regulations, and anti-harassment laws.18 In each of these areas, the government tends to silence 
individuals who need their voices heard. 
At the center of these discussions occurring in schools is the delicate balance between a 
student’s right to free speech and the school’s ability to control its own message while achieving 
its educational goals inside and beyond the classroom.19 The schools ability to control its 
message is difficult to balance with the student’s right to express their feelings during school-
sponsored events. This is particularly complicated because students are restricted the most while 
                                                
16 Rebecca L. Zeidel, Forecasting Disruption, Forfeiting Speech: Restrictions on Student Speech in 
Extracurricular Activities, 53 B.C.L. REV. 303, 306 (2012) (Discussing the Supreme Court’s finding in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).   
17 John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U.L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2005).   
18 Id. at 1106.   
19 Zeidel, supra note 13, at 306. (Discussing the distinction between a student’s ability to assert their 
ideas inside and outside of the classroom.  Zeidel notes that speech is mostly restricted inside the 
classroom and not as strictly restricted when students are speaking as individuals conveying their own 
message).   
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under the supervision of school officials. Nevertheless, students are entitled to freely express 
their views if officials do not have valid reasons for regulating their speech.20   
Although this is the case, school officials and courts regulate the speech of students for 
several reasons. For example, school officials can restrict student speech for a legitimate 
pedagogical reason,21 if the speech is vulgar or obscene,22 or if the speech advocates illegal 
activity.23 In either case, school officials bear the burden of proving the constitutionality of their 
actions when restricting speech.24 Still, there are arguments noting that these rules allow 
viewpoint-discrimination,25 force a reduction in speech rights for students participating in 
extracurricular activities,26 and have ultimately reduced freedom of expression inside the 
classroom.27 Of all of these arguments, the heart of the tension lies between forecasting 
disruption in the school and allowing students to express themselves.   
Survivors of Sexual Violence, Forecasting Disruption, Extracurricular Activities, and Free 
Speech Scrutiny in Schools 
 
The problems associated with disruption in schools and survivors of sexual violence 
recently took on a unique set of circumstances in a small Texas community. In October 2008, 
H.S, a student and member of the cheerleading squad at a Texas high school, was sexually 
                                                
20 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) see discussion infra Part II. c. 
21 Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) see discussion infra Part II. c. 
22 Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) see discussion infra Part II. c.  
23 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) see discussion infra Part II. c. 
24 U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000). 
25 John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L. REV. 569, 575 (2009) (Discussing 
the notion that Tinker’s substantial disruption test allows schools to restrict speech based on its message) 
26 Zeidel, supra note 13, at 342-343.  (Discussing the impact that Bethel, 478 U.S. 675, Morse, 551 U.S. 
393, and Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 have on student speech during extracurricular activities and its likeness 
towards restricting student Fourth Amendment rights, and its contradictory impact on the educational 
goals of extracurricular activities and public schools). 
27 Louis P. Nappen, School Safety v. Free Speech: The Seesawing Tolerance Standards for Student’s 
Sexual and Violent Expressions, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 93, 96 (2003) (Discussing cases relying on 
material and substantial disruption to restrict free speech in schools after Tinker). 
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assaulted by two classmates at a private party. The two suspects were arrested and charged with 
criminal sexual assault. They were both removed from regular classes and extracurricular 
activities, but allowed to return after a grand jury declined to indict them on the charges.  
In February 2009, H.S., as a cheerleader, refused to cheer for one of her attackers as he 
shot free throws during a basketball game. H.S. refused by folding her arms or sitting on the 
sideline without disturbing or disrupting the event. After H.S.’ refusal to cheer, school officials 
directed H.S. to cheer for her attacker or leave the game. H.S. decided to leave and she was 
removed from the cheerleading squad. After leaving the game, H.S. was officially removed from 
the cheerleading squad, but allowed to return the following school year.28 
H.S. subsequently brought an action against the school district and officials directly 
involved in her removal from the cheerleading squad. However, the Eastern District court in 
Texas dismissed her case for failure to state a claim conveying factual allegations that supported 
the elements of the asserted causes of action.29 H.S. was allowed to amend the complaint, and 
noted that the school district disparately favored her attackers, denied her equal protection under 
the law because of her gender, her sexual assault report, and her protest of her attackers.30 Again, 
the district court dismissed the case noting that the complaint alleged no facts that supported a 
finding that H.S. was denied her Constitutional rights.31 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s judgment and H.S. appealed. After another review, the 5th Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that H.S.’ First Amendment claim was not frivolous, therefore, she 
would not be held liable for filing a frivolous lawsuit. H.S. appealed again to the Texas Supreme 
                                                
28 Doe v. Silsbee Ind. Sch. Dist., No. 10-40319, 2011 WL 4056739, at *423 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 2011). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 424. 
31 Id. 
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Court, but certiorari was not granted.32 The court’s finding that a survivor must cheer for her 
attacker is a dubious proposition rooted in the idea that students participating in school-
sponsored events are afforded less protection than other students. 
In this instance, the restriction of student speech occurred during a school-sponsored 
extracurricular activity, which is not necessarily unique to athletic teams. In contrast, these 
activities may also include newspapers, performance groups, cheerleading squads, clubs, and 
student government.33 Although these events are not subject to the same control as events taking 
place in the classroom, they do involve significant school resources including facilities and 
instruction, and they also serve educational goals.34 For this reason, courts treat extracurricular 
student speech as curriculum-like, school-sponsored speech, or individual speech under Tinker.35 
Because of this, students engaging in extracurricular activities are often given less protection 
than students who decide not to engage in them.36 This is a result of the voluntary nature of 
extracurricular activities, which allows schools to create policies imposing sanctions on those 
requesting to participate.37 In contrast, independent and unsponsored student speech can also 
serve as a disruption to the school’s mission.38  
The elements outlining an act of disruption arose from Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 39 which is a case that resulted from a group of students who wore black armbands to 
                                                
32 Id. at 428. 
33 Zeidel, supra note 13, at 307.   
34 Id.   
35 Id. at 306.    
36 Diane Heckman, Does Being a Student-Athlete Mean Having to Say You’re Sorry: First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, Apologies and Interscholastic Athletic Programs, 293 ED. LAW REP. 549, (2013) 
(Discussing the increase in restrictions and requirements for student athletes as opposed to requirements 
for non-athletic students). 
37 Zeidel, supra note 13, at 306.    
38 George R. Wright, Tinker and Student Free Speech Rights: A Functionalist Alternative, 41 IND. L 
REV. 107 (2008). 
39 Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
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school as a symbol of their protest of the Vietnam war.40 At the time, students were prohibited 
from wearing such armbands and school officials suspended them to prevent a disturbance. 
Lower courts agreed with the school officials, however, the Supreme Court disagreed. In coming 
to that decision, the court found that there was no evidence that would have led school officials 
to the conclusion that the armbands would result in a substantial disruption of the school’s 
work.41 This was the case because the students simply wore the armbands, a few students made 
hostile remarks to the children wearing the armbands, but there were no threats or acts of 
violence. Notwithstanding this landmark case, courts have continued to support the restriction of 
students’ free speech rights.42 
Recently, courts have dismissed the free speech of students and upheld restrictions in 
light of the special characteristics found in the school environment.43 These courts have 
articulated the finding that school officials are not obligated to tolerate student speech that 
undermines the school’s basic educational mission.44 In contrast, individual student speech that is 
clearly the student’s personal message is less likely to be restricted because the school would be 
exercising a strict viewpoint restriction if they were to suppress one thought while subscribing to 
another.45  
There are a number of situations when school officials need to prohibit expression, 
however, the problem arises when they restrict speech without laying a foundation related to the 
disruption the speech is causing. Moreover, school officials cannot restrict speech simply 
                                                
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 514. 
42 Id. 
43 See e.g. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
44 Zeidel, supra note 13, at 306.   
45 Id.   
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because they fear a disturbance could result from allowing certain viewpoints.46 This notion 
holds to the finding that if there is cause to restrict student speech because it is a substantial 
disruption, school officials must show that the restriction was more than a desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness associated with an unpopular view.47 This particular act would 
have to materially and substantially interfere with discipline and the operation of the school.48   
According to Tinker, if school officials want courts to uphold their restriction, they must 
develop a solid factual foundation showing the substantial disruption and material interference 
drawn from the student’s speech.49 Moreover, the court in Doe held that the school district had 
no duty to promote the student’s message by allowing her to cheer or not cheer as she saw fit.50 
Although this is a clear assertion, some courts have held that individuals viewing certain types of 
student speech could easily conclude that school officials had not endorsed the speech.51 
Nonetheless, the regulation of free speech in schools is aimed to protect youth from speech that 
is obscene, criminal, or used to facilitate crimes against children.52   
 Although these are significant issues to regulate in schools, courts need to impose a 
higher level of review if school officials continue to impose regulations on the speech of 
students. Current information reveals that 35% of cases are strictly reviewed based on the type of 
                                                
46 Tinker, 505-14.   
47 Ronald D. Wenkart, Disruptive Student Speech and the First Amendment: How disruptive does it have 
to be?, 236 ED. LAW REP. 551, 553 (2008) (discussing the importance of distinguishing between 
disruption and discomfort).   
48 Id.   
49 Id. at 569. 
50 Doe v. Silsbee Ind. Sch. Dist., No. 09-41075, 2010 WL 3736233, at *855 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 2010). 
51 Dean v. Utica Community Schools, 345 F. Supp. 2d 799 (Mich. 2004). 
52 Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from 
Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 449 (2000). 
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speech it impacts.53 The majority includes regulations on the electoral process, protest, 
commercial speech, and non-obscene but sexually explicit speech.54 Likewise, contribution 
limitations receive less protection than expenditure limitations in campaign finance laws, 
commercial speech receives less protection than noncommercial speech, and expressive conduct 
receives less protection than pure speech.55 The form of regulation also disturbs the degree of 
scrutiny the restriction is subject to. For example, content-based regulation receives greater 
scrutiny than content-neutral laws, injunctions receive greater scrutiny than laws of general 
applicability, and public forum restrictions receive greater scrutiny than nonpublic forum 
restrictions.56   
The level of scrutiny can be attributed to the interpretation of the First Amendment, 
which does not require the government to be indifferent toward the communicative effects of 
speech, the expression of private viewpoints, or the marketplace of ideas.57 Moreover, the 
application of strict scrutiny does not demand that every restricted statement have a provable and 
identifiable harmful consequence because no restriction would pass the test.58 Nevertheless, the 
forecast of disruption standard allows the restriction of speech by keeping students from 
speaking critically about a school program, even if it is a discussion among students outside of 
the activity.59 This allows school officials to punish students solely because they are questioning 
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authority or refusing to follow direction.60 This issue compels any student volunteering in an 
extracurricular event to forfeit their right to free speech.61 In each case, forcing a student to 
forfeit their right to free speech because it conflicts with other viewpoints will continue to chill 
the speech of individuals that need to tell their story to recover. 
 
Redefining Free Speech Restrictions and Empowering Survivors in Schools 
 
School officials and courts have interpreted a number of situations and decided to restrict 
the free speech of students for a legitimate academic reason. Admittedly, there are legitimate 
reasons for restricting student speech, but the legitimate academic reason for forcing H.S. to 
cheer for her alleged attacker is based upon the notion that cheerleaders should first and foremost 
support athletes. This thought is contrary to H.S.’s idea of supporting herself as a survivor. 
Instead of affirming the latter and asserting the value of a survivor’s speech, courts use the legal 
precedent from free speech cases where speech was restricted for being lewd or obscene,62 for 
reasons related to privacy,63 or speech advocating illegal activity.64 In the case of H.S., there was 
nothing lewd or obscene about her speech, her speech did not violate the privacy of the 
perpetrator, her speech was not disruptive, and it did not advocate illegal activity.  
In taking a closer look at the case involving H.S., the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
that H.S.’s decision not to cheer for her alleged attackers was protected speech because it was 
particularized a symbolic expression of her disapproval of her attacker’s behavior.65 However, 
the court ultimately concluded that H.S.’s speech would substantially interfere with the work of 
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the school,66 and the school had no duty to promote H.S.’s speech because she was acting as a 
cheerleader under the direction of the school.67 Lastly, the court noted that although “these 
arguments did not win the day, it was error to conclude that H.S.’s First Amendment claim was 
‘so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation.’”68 The court 
consequently remanded the case for recalculation of attorney’s fees. 
To address the issue surrounding a disruption, courts must redefine the guidelines for 
identifying a substantial disruption and school-sponsored speech in schools. In these cases, a 
fact-intensive analysis would reduce the likelihood of schools punishing or suppressing 
extracurricular student speech.69 When applying the facts involving H.S., it is noteworthy that 
her silent protest was not a disruption to the basketball game because the record does not show 
that her speech was lewd or indecent.  
In contrast with Doe, the court found that the defendant in Bethel v. Fraser exhibited lewd 
and indecent speech that was unrelated to any political viewpoint.70 In this particular case, the 
defendant, who was a high school student at the time, delivered a speech nominating a fellow 
student for elective office at the school. The speech was given at a voluntary assembly that was 
held during school hours as part of a school-sponsored educational program. The assembly was 
comprised of approximately 600 students and many of them were 14-year-olds.71  
Prior to giving the speech, the defendant discussed the content with several teachers and 
two of them advised him that it was inappropriate and should not be given. Despite this, the 
student delivered the speech and referred to his candidate in “terms of an elaborate, graphic, and 
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explicit sexual metaphor.”72 As a result, some of the students hooted and yelled during the 
speech, some of the students simulated sexual activities that were alluded to in the speech, and 
others appeared to be confused and embarrassed. The principal of the school suspended the 
student for two days and the court held that the school district acted within its permissible 
authority.73 
With this conclusion, the court asserted that the First Amendment does not prevent school 
officials from determining how vulgar and lewd speech, such as Fraser’s speech, would 
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.74 Lastly, the court noted that vulgar speech 
and lewd conduct are entirely inconsistent with the values of public school education, therefore, 
the First Amendment does not protect this type of speech.75 
In highlighting a distinction with this case, H.S.’s involvement as a cheerleader did not 
have a significant impact on the viewers of her speech. The issue of a significant impact is noted 
in the dissenting opinion of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, where Justice Brennan articulated that 
student speech “is more likely to disrupt a curricular function when it arises in the context of a 
curricular activity…thus, under Tinker, the school may constitutionally punish the budding 
political orator if he the disrupts calculus class but not if he holds his tongue for the cafeteria.”76   
 In Hazelwood,77 several high school students were members of a Journalism II class and 
they published an article describing three students’ experience with pregnancy and another 
article discussing the impact of divorce on students of the school. Prior to the articles being 
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published, the principal reviewed the articles and refused to allow them for several reasons.  
First, the principle noted that the writers of the articles were unable to completely keep the 
identity of the students confidential. Next, the principal thought that the content of the article was 
inappropriate for some younger students because it contained references to sexual activity and 
birth control. Lastly, the principal was concerned about a story that was critical of a student’s 
parents and he believed the parents should respond to the remarks or consent to their 
publication.78 
 In this case, the court looked to each of the principal’s arguments and analyzed them. In 
doing this, the court found that the students of the school would have easily identified the 
pregnant students through an easy process of deduction.79 Likewise, the court noted that the 
stories would infringe upon the privacy interests of the students’ boyfriends and parents because 
they were discussed, but they were not given the opportunity to consent to the publication or 
respond to it.80 Lastly, the court found that the stories did not contain graphic accounts of sexual 
activity, however, the subjects of the articles did comment on their sexual history and the non-
use of birth control.81 This led the court to the conclusion that the principal was reasonable in 
foreseeing that the discussion was inappropriate for many of the 14-year-old students and their 
younger brothers and sisters.82 As a result, the court found that the principal acted within his 
power by objecting to the publishing of those stories, thus, there was no violation of the First 
Amendment.83 
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 Unlike  Hazelwood, the defendant in Doe did not violate several of the elements that led 
the court to the conclusion that the student’s speech was not protected. First, Doe’s speech did 
not convey content that was inappropriate for younger students that were present because it did 
not feature any communication containing substance. Although the record reflects the idea that 
the audience would have been aware of the reason for her protest, Doe did not verbally convey 
details of the assault or exhibit any behavior mocking the subject of her protest. Instead, Doe 
quietly folded her arms or sat by the cheerleading sponsor.84   
Next, the privacy of her attacker was an issue of concern because H.S. only protested when 
he was the subject of cheers.85 Nevertheless, this is easily resolved because the subject of her 
protest had already been identified in news publications, police reports, and court proceedings.86 
Therefore, this matter had already entered the public arena and individuals who were present 
would have been aware of the relationship between Doe and the subject.87 This awareness would 
alleviate concerns for the privacy of the subject because he had no privacy at that point.   
Based on the defense’s argument in Doe, it is important to note that school officials are 
concerned about their status as a supporter of a student’s particular speech.88 Although school 
officials retain the authority to compel against and discipline students for acts that are immoral, 
however, if H.S.’s speech was not immoral and if her viewpoint would have coincided with the 
viewpoint of school officials, she would have been allowed to continue her protest. This form of 
viewpoint discrimination is what the First Amendment prohibits.89 Similarly, the school officials 
                                                
84 Doe, 2011 WL 4056739, at *424. 
85 Id. 
86 Amy Collins & Blair Ortmann, Silsbee football players free on bond in cheerleader rape case, 
BEAUMONT ENTERPRISE, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/Silsbee-
football-players-free-on-bond-in-769612.pdf. 
87 Doe, 2011 WL 4056739, at *428. 
88 Id. at *427. 
89 Fee, supra note 14, at 1124. (Citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
20 
 
restricting her speech had little to no involvement in cheerleading or the game as they held 
positions of greater responsibility than cheerleading or coaching.90 
 Even if the court found that the student’s speech did not deserve free speech protection, 
their harsh ultimatum that the survivor “cheer when others cheered or to go home”91 speaks to 
their disapproval of her actions and their inability to resolve conflict in a sensitive manner. 
Instead of following this blueprint, school officials should engage students in dialogue to come 
to a conclusion that accommodates the needs of survivors of sexual violence while ultimately 
fulfilling the needs of the school. 
 The idea that the needs of the school should coincide with the needs of the student should 
be the cornerstone of the educational environment. In applying this notion to the needs of a 
survivor of sexual violence, schools should assist the survivor in properly coping with the trauma 
associated with sexual violence. In the case of H.S., her therapist suggested that she continue her 
routine to help deal with the trauma and that included cheerleading.92 Beyond this particular 
instance, clinicians should encourage students and their families to work with schools to devise 
suitable forms of expression and schools should be open to such cooperation.93 Without this 
compromise, survivors in these situations can experience avoidance coping, which is associated 
with post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms.94 Failing to assist survivors in coping with these 
situations by restricting their free speech, for unsupportable reasons, ultimately contributes to 
failures in reporting and survivor silencing. 
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IV. FALSE REPORTING AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE 
 
Laws Addressing False Reports of Criminal Activity and Police Misconduct 
 
Although constitutional restrictions on survivor speech can reduce reporting of sexual 
violence, false reporting of crimes and police misconduct is also a critical issue worthy of 
society’s attention. When addressing false reports, issues arise because these laws can be abused 
by hostile and overzealous police officers lacking the appropriate training to understand the 
dynamics of sexual violence. Furthermore, a democracy is rooted in a citizen’s right to voice 
their concerns about governmental action without being impeded by criminal laws.95 Overall, 
allowing an extension of governmental power that criminalizes reporting a crime can erode the 
public trust by enforcing the belief that police officers can arrest a citizen if they believe they are 
falsely reporting a crime and police misconduct.  
Although there is value in curbing false reports, it can have an adverse impact on 
survivors of sexual violence. For example, statutes that criminalize speech conveying police 
misconduct can suppress legitimate and truthful criticism of police officers out of fear of 
unwarranted prosecution.96  Lastly, citizens with knowledge of police misconduct may fear 
disbelief on the part of investigating officers and may lack the necessary resources to prove their 
assertions in court.97   
The criminalization of falsely reporting a crime is based upon the idea that people report 
crimes that never happened for illegitimate reasons. Although there has been little research in 
this area, it has been noted that individuals falsely report crime for several reasons. The most 
frequently stated reasons for falsely reporting sexual violence includes providing an alibi, 
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obtaining financial gain, protection from the consequences of other behavior, seeking revenge, or 
obtaining sympathy and attention.98 The most common reasons for falsely reporting crimes like 
stalking include obtaining financial gain, rage and retaliation, delusions, severe mental disorders, 
hypersensitivity after past victimization, and gratification from victim status.99   
In addition to malicious reporting, allegations of sexual violence may come in non-
malicious ways. For example, individuals with a medical condition may genuinely believe they 
have been subjected to sexual violence, but the offense never occurred and they did not make it 
for a malicious purpose.100 Likewise, a complainant may have suspected that they were sexually 
assaulted while asleep or intoxicated, but a sexual assault examination revealed that a sexual 
assault did not occur.101 Despite these specific instances of false reporting, these reasons can be 
applied to other offenses that are falsely reported.102 
Because there are several reasons why people falsely report crimes, several states have 
enacted laws that prohibit and criminalize it. These laws embody the idea that a citizen commits 
a crime when they knowingly convey false statements of fact.103 The State of Minnesota defines 
false reporting as: 
Whoever informs a law enforcement officer that a crime has been 
committed or otherwise provides information to an on-duty peace 
officer, knowing that the person is a peace officer, regarding the 
conduct of others, knowing that it is false and intending that the 
officer shall act in reliance upon it, is guilty of a misdemeanor.  A 
person who is convicted a second or subsequent time under this 
section is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.104 
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Although the State of Minnesota categorizes false reporting as a misdemeanor for first time 
offenders, other states have categorized false reporting as a felony. For example, Arkansas,105 
California,106 Connecticut,107 Illinois,108 Indiana,109 Michigan,110 New Jersey,111 New York,112 
Ohio,113 Pennsylvania,114 Tennessee,115 and Wyoming116 have made making a false report a 
felony.  Other states have followed the Minnesota frame and made false reporting a 
misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor.   
Regardless of the penalty, false reporting statutes essentially offer justice for the infliction 
of defamatory falsehoods and the avoidable diversion of criminal justice resources.117 This is 
undoubtedly an important issue because false reports misappropriate valuable criminal justice 
resources and have the potential to result in the incarceration of innocent individuals. The initial 
diversion of criminal justice resources imposes an unnecessary burden to police departments, 
social services, healthcare facilities, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, juries, and society.   
Although these laws work to deter and hold individuals accountable for falsely reporting 
crime, these laws create a series of issues for survivors of sexual violence. First, the defendants 
in these offenses are swept into the criminal justice process as a complainant, but quickly turned 
into a suspect if they do not fit the description of a typical complainant. Next, these laws 
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criminalize statements made by a survivor of sexual violence after they have suffered a traumatic 
event. Likewise, laws that allow police officials to prosecute citizens for filing a complaint 
against an officer have a tendency to deter a citizen’s willingness to file a complaint that is 
lacking concrete evidence.118 Lastly, these laws are narrowly tailored to protect a certain class of 
individuals while excluding others. 
 
Myths Contributing to Arrests for False Reports of Sexual Violence  
 
While there is cause to suspect that crimes are falsely reported, many factors may 
contribute to the myths surrounding sexual violence. These myths can lead to false arrests and 
malicious prosecution. One myth is the perception of sexual violence from men’s rights activists 
who sensationalize statistics and news reports related to false reporting of sexual violence.  For 
example, the blog, Men’s Rights, asserts that false rape claims are the result of society’s instilled 
feminist ideology.119 Moreover, the blog cites a statistic from a former Colorado prosecutor, who 
claimed that as many as 45% of sexual assault claims made in Denver could potentially be 
false.120 Although these statistics clearly assert that false accusations occur, they do not take into 
account the number of sexual assaults that are not reported. More importantly, claims like these 
may deter additional survivors from reporting the offense and cloud the judgment of the officers 
tasked with investigating these crimes.121   
In another study, researchers reviewed 2,059 sexual assault cases and found that 7% of 
the allegations were in fact false reports.122 During the research, the participating law 
enforcement agencies were given ongoing training and support regarding the consistent 
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definitions of false reports.123  Several studies echo the aforementioned findings and note that 1-
11% of sexual assault allegations are false.124 However, some researchers continue to contend 
that false reports cannot be measured due to the bias and internalization of myths surrounding 
sexual violence.125   
Sexual assault myths are commonly a result of stereotypes of rape that indicate the 
following elements are generally true in crimes of sexual violence. These stereotypes include the 
requirement that the suspect must be a stranger, a weapon and violence must have occurred, the 
survivor must have been hysterical and immediately reported the event, there must be signs of 
physical injury, the survivor must not have exercised bad judgment at the time of the assault, the 
survivor has never reported a sexual assault in the past, and the suspect was described as sick, 
crazy, or deranged, not respectable, credible, or likeable.126   
Myths and stereotypes can also lead to police hostility. Police hostility towards survivors 
can be attributed to the belief that survivors either fabricate allegations of sexual violence from a 
consensual sexual encounter or they caused it by their own behavior.127  Consequently, false 
arrest and malicious prosecution can be an issue for survivors of sexual violence who have 
already undergone a very traumatic event.128 The last thing they need is a hostile police officer 
with a desire to use false reporting laws as a method of punishing a survivor. Furthermore, 
survivors also have to contend with the reality that a trial would likely focus on their behavior 
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instead of the perpetrator or the officer.129 Likewise, it has been articulated that women’s 
behavior seems inherently to be subject to scrutiny and judgment.130  However, rape shield laws 
withhold defense attorneys and alleged perpetrators from scrutinizing the survivor’s past sexual 
behavior at trial.131 If this were to be extended to police officers tasked with investigating these 
offenses, it would ultimately contribute to a decrease in arrests for false reporting of sexual 
violence. This would occur because the judgment of officers would not be overshadowed by the 
previous actions of the survivor. 
Although these are issues worthy of attention, the criminalization of reporting crime or 
police misconduct has consequences when it is incorrectly used by police officers. For example, 
there are a number of offenses that can be falsely reported and these offenses fall outside of 
police misconduct and sexual violence. During a review of false reports, researchers found that 
these crimes can include abduction, physical assault, attempted murder, threats, arson, extortion, 
and carjacking.132 Nevertheless, of all crimes falsely reported in the study, false allegations 
featuring an element of sexual violence made up 59.1% of the 30 false report prosecutions 
studied.133 Although this number is high, the researchers asserted that there is a need for 
additional research in this area to explore and compare the nature of false reports.134 
Studies like these, combined with the use of false reporting statutes can make it appear 
that survivors are fabricating a high rate of instances of sexual violence. This can lead police 
officers and society to the conclusion that there is a significant amount of false allegations of 
sexual violence when it is not the case. This belief can influence the behavior of officers when 
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they are tasked with investigating these types of offenses and contribute to their skepticism of the 
survivor’s statement. Likewise, society can exhibit an adverse response to survivors if they 
believe their allegations are false, which can lead survivors to the belief that they contributed to 
the offense. These issues collectively silence survivors by deterring them from reporting 
victimization out of fear of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. 
When reviewing the presence of sexual violence and survivor rights, one cannot ignore 
the presence of rape myths. The myths are based upon the assumption that alleged survivors of 
sexual violence falsely report offenses for nefarious reasons. In a study from 1994, occurring 
over a nine-year time period, researchers found that 41% of 109 reported sexual assaults were 
deemed to be false at a Midwest police agency. Although these reports were deemed to be false 
the detectives made the determination without a substantive review by the researcher or anyone 
else.135 Moreover, the police department in question had the practice of offering polygraphs to 
survivors bringing allegations of sexual assault, which has been mostly outlawed because of its 
intimidating impact on survivors.136 Above all, sensationalizing false reports of sexual violence 
leads to situations where police officers and society may assume that most reporters of sexual 
violence are falsely reporting crimes for malicious reasons. 
 
Testing the Constitutionality of Falsely Reporting Police Misconduct Laws 
 
The reduction of false reports is an issue worth resolving, but this has also influenced the 
need to reduce false reports that target police officers. The State of Minnesota is one of only a 
few states that have embraced this notion and prohibited falsely reporting police misconduct.  
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The aim of these laws is to criminalize false speech that is critical of a police officer’s conduct 
while enforcing laws. Falsely reporting police misconduct is defined in the state of Minnesota as: 
 
Whoever informs, or causes information to be communicated to, a 
peace officer, whose responsibilities include investigating or 
reporting police misconduct, that a peace officer…has committed 
an act of police misconduct, knowing that the information is false, 
is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as follows: (1) up to the 
maximum provided for a misdemeanor if the false information 
does not allege a criminal act; or (2) up to the maximum provided 
for a gross misdemeanor if the false information alleges a criminal 
act.137 
 
Statutes criminalizing falsely reporting police misconduct are subject to broader analysis by 
courts than falsely reporting any other offense. This is the case because these laws attempt to 
reduce the amount of unethical citizens who “maliciously file false allegations of misconduct 
against officers in an effort to punish them for simply doing their jobs.”138 Also, when citizens 
make false complaints of police officer misconduct, they cause valuable resources to be 
expended investigating false claims as opposed to valid claims.139 Lastly, these false complaints 
can result in unwarranted penalties being imposed on an officer who was simply doing his or her 
job.140  
 Despite these issues, only a few states have enacted laws that prohibit falsely reporting 
police officer misconduct.  Outside of Minnesota, Wisconsin141 and California142 are the only 
other states that have prohibited falsely reporting police misconduct. However, California found 
their version of this law to be unconstitutional because it “holds citizens accountable for their 
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knowing falsehoods, while leaving unregulated the knowingly false speech of a peace officer or 
witness.”143 That decision was based on the idea that these laws are viewpoint and content-based 
restrictions discriminating against a certain class of anti-government speech while protecting 
pro-government speech.144 Said another way, statutes criminalizing false reports of police 
misconduct hold citizen’s accountable for their false complaints, but these statutes fail to regulate 
any other false speech that is in support a police officer.145 Above all, these laws hold citizens 
accountable for falsehoods, while leaving falsehoods made by police officers and witnesses of 
the misconduct unregulated.146 Courts have doubted the rationality of these laws because they are 
under-inclusive in their regulation of certain speech.147 For example, these statutes do not protect 
against accusations involving firefighters, paramedics, teachers, elected officials, or anyone 
else.148   
There are issues related to these types of laws because they allow the state to punish a 
number of individuals while allowing the speech of others.149 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
recently tested the constitutionality of such a statute and narrowly constructed it to make it 
constitutional.150 The test was a result of State v. Crawley, which is a case involving the 
conviction of Melisa Crawley for filing a false police report. The case occurred after she 
informed a police officer that another officer had forged her signature on a medical release form. 
When the officer went to investigate, he located a witness who reported that she saw Crawley 
sign the release. Crawley was subsequently charged with falsely reporting police misconduct and 
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falsely reporting a crime.  Crawley attempted to have the charges dismissed by articulating that 
the statute was unconstitutional because it was a form of viewpoint discrimination because it 
criminalized false speech that is critical of a police officer, but allowed false speech that is 
supportive of a police officer.151 The Winona County District Court disagreed, and Crawley was 
found guilty of both counts during a jury trial.152 
The constitutional issue is notable because statutes criminalizing false reports of police 
misconduct have been applied to survivors of sexual violence.153 For example, this law was 
applied after an individual reported that she had been sexually assaulted by two Minneapolis 
police officers.154 An internal-affairs investigation followed, and the survivor reported that she 
was handcuffed and sexually penetrated by one of the officers while the other held her down.  
Conversely, evidence noted that the officer’s DNA did not match DNA recovered from the 
survivor. Furthermore, GPS records showed that the officer’s squad car was not at the location 
the survivor reported during the investigation.  As a result, the individual was charged and 
subsequently convicted of falsely reporting police misconduct.155 Although the law worked in 
this instance, there is still the possibility that individuals will not report acts of police misconduct 
out of fear of prosecution. Additionally, these false reporting laws give officers a sense of 
incivility when they are exerting their authority over citizens. Lastly, this incivility can lead to 
police hostility, which can erode public trust and silence victims of police misconduct in addition 
to survivors of sexual violence that comes from police officers. 
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Reducing Police Hostility and Arrests for False Reports of Sexual Violence through 
Adequate Training 
 
The police response to acts of sexual violence can begin with unjustified hostility from 
some officers. This hostility has a great impact on the liberty of survivors. An officer of the 
Cincinnati Police Department recently exhibited this behavior on January 19, 2014. Prior to the 
incident, Jane Doe alleged that she was sexually assaulted by a cab driver after she departed a 
downtown nightclub. Following the sexual assault, Doe was pulled out of the vehicle by the 
rapist and slammed down on the ground, causing her to hit her head and go in and out of 
consciousness.  A witness saw the survivor and notified the Cincinnati Police.  The witness then 
allowed Doe to rest in her vehicle while they waited for an officer to arrive.156   
Once Officer Adrienne Brown arrived, she quickly commanded that Doe “get the fuck 
out of the car” and grabbed a phone from Doe’s hand as she attempted to contact her family.157  
Officer Brown placed Doe in the back seat of her police cruiser and drove toward the hospital, 
but decided to arrest Doe because she had trouble getting information from her. Officer Brown 
subsequently charged Doe with resisting arrest and disorderly conduct while intoxicated. Officer 
Brown’s acts in this instance must be addressed through the use of a victim advocate who could 
help prevent this type of behavior because it tends to subjects a survivor to a second instance of 
victimization.158 Lastly, officers should adopt the idea that survivors are being truthful until they 
have evidence to suggest otherwise. While this can be a difficult practice to implement, it must 
be done to reduce unjustified false reporting arrests and additional trauma to survivors. 
Once charged with falsely reporting sexual violence, survivors have attempted to assert that 
their statements regarding the assault were coerced or involuntary given during the investigative 
                                                
156 Complaint at ¶ 12, 15, Doe v. Brown, No. 1:2014cv00081 (Ohio S. Dist. Ct., Jan. 27, 2014.) 
157 Id. at ¶ 20-21. 
158 Rebecca Campbell, Rape Survivors’ Experience With the Legal and Medical Systems: Do Rape Victim 
Advocates Make a Difference?, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 30, 30-31 (2006).  
32 
 
interview.159 To determine if a statement was involuntary or coerced, courts examine the totality 
of the circumstances and its influence on the survivor at the time of the statement.160 Courts base 
the totality of the circumstances on the survivor’s “age, maturity, intelligence, education, 
experience and ability to comprehend; the lack of or adequacy of warnings; the length and 
legality of the detention; the nature of the interrogation; and whether the defendant was deprived 
of physical needs or denied access to friends.”161 Nevertheless, police interrogations can lead to 
survivors deciding that they no longer want to cooperate with the investigation, but at the point, 
it is too late. 
One of the worst instances of a police interrogation resulting in an arrest of a survivor 
occurred on July 14, 2004. In this case, a cashier at a convenience store was sexually assaulted 
and robbed at gunpoint by a serial sex offender. She immediately reported the offense, 
underwent a sexual assault exam, and gave detailed and consistent statements to law enforcement 
and hospital staff. However, the lead investigator assigned to the case believed that she falsely 
reported the offense to cover up her own theft of the money from the convenience store. The 
detective ultimately launched an investigation and arrested the survivor for falsely reporting a 
crime and other offenses.162   
As a result, the survivor spent five days in jail, but the charges were dropped after the serial 
rapist who assaulted her was captured and confessed to the offense.163 In this case, the court took 
all inferences in favor of the plaintiff and concluded that the evidence in the case was not 
sufficient enough to “warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed an 
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offense.”164  This judgment is based upon the principles of the probable cause standard, which 
indicates that probable cause is met when the “terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to 
warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an 
offense.”165 This finding should lead investigators of sexual violence to the conclusion that they 
must invest their time in a thorough investigation of the sexual assault as opposed to an 
investigation of the survivor.  
When determining that a sexual assault report is false, research suggests that a final 
judgment must be based upon a thorough, evidence-based investigation that concludes that the 
sexual assault was not attempted or completed.166 This notion is consistent with the FBI Uniform 
Crime Report’s method for clearing cases.167 Herein lies a problem because many agencies 
categorize their reports as false without any evidence to support that the offense did not occur or 
the survivor lied about the incident.168 In attempting to resolve this issue, the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police has provided a model for investigating sexual assault cases and 
determining if they are false. The report notes that: 
The determination that a report of sexual assault is false can be 
made only if the evidence establishes that no crime was committed 
or attempted.  This determination can be made only after a 
thorough investigation.  This should not be confused with an 
investigation that fails to prove a sexual assault occurred.  In that 
case the investigation would be labeled unsubstantiated.  The 
determination that a report is false must be supported by evidence 
that the assault did not happen.169 
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Despite this, investigators use several issues regarding the survivor’s account of the assault to 
inappropriately conclude that the survivor has fabricated the event. These issues involve delayed 
reports, inconsistencies in the survivor’s statement, survivors deciding not to cooperate with 
investigators, the survivor concealing criminal behavior, and intoxication on the part of the 
survivor.170 
 Several police departments have reduced the rate of false reports of sexual assault in their 
jurisdiction.  These police departments have utilized specialized sexual assault analysis units and 
female police officers for investigative interviews.171 These changes reduced the number of false 
reports to 2%, which coincides with the rate of false reports for other violent crimes.172 Lastly, 
the determination that a report is false should be based on a significant number of indicators. 
These indicators correspond with and contradict the myths surrounding sexual violence, but they 
do not substitute the survivor’s account of the incident. The indicators include the presence of a 
perpetrator that is an acquaintance who is not identified by name, a survivor asserting that they 
physically resisted throughout the assault, and the assault only involving penile-vaginal 
penetration.173 
 Likewise, there are indicators related to the survivor that include an increase in the 
survivor’s problems surrounding life and personal relationships, a documented history of mental 
or emotional problems, or a copycat of a high-profile crime.174 Although these cases are a reality, 
police officers should exercise care when acting on suspicion of a false report because they could 
impose irreversible damage on a survivor that was sexually assaulted. If the report is deemed to 
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be false, investigators and prosecutors should consult with other stakeholders like victim 
advocates, mental health professionals, and child advocates. Lastly, the consequences of the false 
report should be assessed to determine if there were significant consequences for a wrongfully 
accused subject or if substantial resources were extinguished investigating the allegations.175 
After doing all of these things, an officer should make a decision as to the need to arrest and file 
charges against a survivor. 
 When dealing with these types of crimes, police departments could reduce the damage 
they impose on survivors by training their law enforcement officers to properly deal with 
allegations of sexual violence. In 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination act to 
reduce sexual violence in prisons. The standards of the act hold that training correctional staff in 
a manner that ensures that they “understand and appreciate the significance of prison rape and 
the necessity of its eradication” can reduce sexual violence in prisons.176 While the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act acknowledges the need to train correctional staff to reduce sexual violence in 
prison, the Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training Administrator’s Manual 
makes no mention of training police officers to ensure that they understand the dynamics of 
sexual violence.177  
Furthermore, the 2013-2014 Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Criminal 
Justice Training and Education course catalog contains no courses for investigating acts of 
criminal sexual conduct.178 These failures in adequate training and oversight can contribute to 
police hostility and the inappropriate understanding and investigation of crimes involving acts of 
                                                
175 Id. at 22.   
176 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15606 (2003). 
177 Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training Law Enforcement Administrator’s Manual: 
In-Service Training Policy and Reporting (2011). 
178 2013-2014 Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Criminal Justice Training and Education 
course catalog (2013). 
36 
 
sexual violence. To address this issue, the Violence Against Women Act has provided funds for 
training law enforcement officers, however, law enforcement officers and administrators need to 
use these resources to develop training programs for understanding sexual violence.179 
Development of these training programs could reduce police hostility, empower survivors 
throughout the investigative process, and reduce the number of false arrests for reporting sexual 
violence. 
 
V. DEFAMATION CLAIMS AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
 
Resolving False Allegations with Defamation Claims 
 
While survivors can have their free speech restricted by constitutional law and their 
liberty revoked by criminal law, in some cases alleged perpetrators can pursue defamation claims 
against a survivor. In these cases, defamation laws work to offer some retribution for individuals 
who have had their reputation damaged by speech they allege to be false. 180  Although 
defamation lawsuits can offer retribution, they do not result in an immediate punishment for 
survivors who have fabricated an allegation of sexual violence, and alleged perpetrators have a 
difficult time clearing their name.181 Nevertheless, individuals who are the subject of false 
allegations of sexual assault rightfully bring these claims against their accuser and they recover 
damages in some cases.182 The basis for defamation claims for false allegations of sexual assault 
can certainly be understood following the defamation claim against Tawana Brawley.183   
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Cases that are fabricated and severely damage the reputation of innocent individuals are a 
perfect example of the need for defamation laws. In cases of sexual assault, survivors found to 
have falsely reported allegations of sexual violence should certainly be punished and individuals 
who are subjected to these false allegations should be vindicated. However, the problem arises 
when survivors of sexual violence have their case judged by their actions leading up to the 
assault rather than the harm they experienced.184 Likewise, the fear of punishment could further 
prevent survivors who have truly been sexually assaulted from coming forward.185 Above all, 
defamation cases will continue to silence survivors if courts disregard their account of the 
offense, if the perpetrators are allowed to exploit their privacy, and if the burden of proof isn’t 
increased.  
 
Survivors of Sexual Violence and Defamation Laws 
 
Survivors of sexual violence are at a severe disadvantage because defamation laws easily 
apply to sexual assault allegations. First, defamation claims involving sexual violence often 
receive consideration in the courts because they are allegations involving crimes of moral 
turpitude. 186  Next, defamation is based upon the distinction between opinion and statements that 
are based on fact.187 This distinction holds that opinions are protected, but statements based on 
fact are not.188 In addition, statements of fact are based on rhetorical hyperbole, which is a 
method that considers the context of the statement and the receiver’s interpretation of its 
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meaning.189 However, the rhetorical hyperbole test is not being used in all states, as some only 
determine what a reasonable reader would assume from reading the statement.190 Lastly, a 
complete allegation of sexual violence would be based upon the factual statements of the sexual 
assault complainant, which essentially makes these claims easy to interpret. Nonetheless, most 
defamation cases involving sexual assault allegations never make it to court because the plaintiff 
fails to show damages.191   
The failure to show damages is the theme of Lee v. Pennington.192 The case occurred in 
1999, after George Lee III was arrested on two counts of aggravated rape and one count of 
forcible rape. Several television news stations aired segments related to the arrest, and the Time-
Picayune published an article about the arrest the next day, and Lee argued that it characterized 
him as a serial rapist. Shortly after, Lee filed a defamation petition against several city officials 
and media outlets claiming damages for defamation and other violations. However, Lee’s 
petition did not survive because the court found that the publication and broadcasting of the story 
was a matter of public record that Lee was found guilty of.193 Furthermore, malice could not be 
established because publishers reserve the right to publish articles and air newscasts to inform 
the public.194 Lastly, Lee failed to support his claim of injury with credible evidence, therefore, 
the court found his defamation claim to be solely without merit.195 The failure to support 
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defamation claims by plaintiffs is a common occurrence in these matters; nonetheless, survivors 
often find few resources when defending their allegations in a defamation case.196 
Complainants in defamation cases have also contended that the survivor subjected them 
to the intentional infliction of emotional distress by falsely alleging that the complainant sexually 
assaulted them.197 In these cases, the court holds that the plaintiff must assert and prove four 
elements to establish that the defendant subjected them to intentional emotional distress. Those 
elements include “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the intentional or reckless nature of 
such conduct; (3) a causal relationship between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) 
severe emotional distress.”198  
Courts have found that several instances of false accusations do not rise to a level high 
enough to warrant a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.199 Courts have 
noted that the intentional infliction of emotional distress must be based upon outrageous 
conduct.200 However, the free speech clause of the First Amendment can be used as a defense to 
combat the defamation claim.201 Nevertheless, the notion of outrageous conduct must also be 
linked to speech that is conveyed against a private person that can be deemed true or false. 
Furthermore, the inclination of outrageousness has been compared to the elements of the fighting 
words doctrine.   
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Malicious Use of Defamation Laws in Sexual Violence Cases 
 
Another issue related to defamation is the possibility of the accused bringing an action 
against the survivor while criminal proceedings are pending.202 When this occurs, the survivor 
has to deal with the defamation proceedings while the sexual assault investigation is ongoing. 
This could further disrupt the psychological recovery of the survivor and drive them to the point 
where they wish they never reported the offense in the first place. In the worst cases, alleged 
perpetrators of sexual assault will use defamation claims to intimidate and threaten the 
survivor.203   
This problem is demonstrated by defamation claims where an alleged perpetrator may 
attempt to exploit the sexuality of a survivor by offering it as evidence.204 Furthermore, an 
alleged perpetrator may use defamation as a means to coerce a survivor into mediating the 
defamation claim or recanting their sexual assault allegation during the sexual assault 
investigation.205 Several of these issues are underscored by Routh v. University of Rochester. 206 
In this case, Dylan Routh brought an action against the University of Rochester and his ex-
girlfriend after she claimed that he sexually assaulted her several times while they were both 
enrolled at the university.  
The case began after Routh told the survivor he was no longer interested in engaging in 
sexual contact with her. A few days later, the survivor filed a complaint and a five-page written 
statement against Routh alleging that he sexually assaulted her by strangulation, rape, and 
forcible imprisonment. The next day, Routh was suspended from the university and directed to 
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leave campus. During the investigation, it was determined that Routh and the survivor engaged 
in a sexual relationship between September 2008 and September 2011 and some of the sexual 
acts involved binding, gagging, whipping, and burning of the survivor.   
Prior to September of 2010, all of the sexual activity was categorized as consensual, but 
the survivor alleged that the sexual activity following that time was not consensual.207 In addition 
to the complaint she filed with the university, the survivor also filed complaints against Routh 
with the Monroe County Family Court and the Monroe County District Attorney’s Office. 
However, the survivor withdrew the Family Court Complaint and a Monroe County Grand Jury 
declined to bring criminal charges because of a lack of evidence. 208 
In the case of Routh, he rightfully brought his claim for defamation, but the problem 
arose when he attempted to coerce the survivor into an agreement to mediate the claim. The act 
in question occurred on March 18, 2012, when Routh sent the survivor and her attorney an e-
mail stating: 
I am writing to inform you that I will shortly be filing a motion to 
amend my complaint against your clients to plead with more 
specificity.  My original pleading was vague, primarily at the 
urging of my mother who wishes to avoid embarrassment for all 
parties.  However, because you have complained about the lack of 
specificity on various charges, I will be getting very specific.  In 
reviewing my records to allege specificity, I found the following 
Facebook message communications which occurred between 
myself and Sarah Hulbert 2010[.]  
 
[Routh then sets forth the sexually explicit text, mentioned earlier, 
verbatim].   
 
I will be making these messages public in my amended complaint.  
I am not asking you to consent to the filing of the amended 
complaint, I assume you will oppose.  However, because I had not 
previously made you aware of the existence of these messages, I 
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am writing at the urging of my mother to give you one last chance 
to agree to mediate these issues before going public.    
 
Sarah Hulbert libeled and slandered me when she claimed I 
undertook any sexual activity against her consent.  The University 
has discriminated against me and violated its contractual 
obligations to treat me fairly.  I would simply pursue my rights in 
every appropriate forum, but I am being urged to suggest mediate 
one last time by my mother, in spite of your ridiculous attacks 
against her. 
 
So I am giving you that opportunity.  If I do not hear that you agree 
to mediation of all issues by the noon [sic] (pacific time) on 
Thursday, I will move forward with the filing of the amended 
complaint and making these messages public. 
Sincerely, Dylan Routh.209 
 
With this act, Routh crosses an important boundary by attempting to coerce the survivor into 
mediating the defamation claim. Furthermore, Routh’s attempt to exploit the survivor’s sexuality 
by revealing a sexually graphic message, for a malicious purpose is exactly what Rape Shield 
laws prohibit.210 These types of acts create unnecessary damage to survivors and alleged 
perpetrators should not be allowed to use this type of information for malicious purposes.   
 Rape shield laws could help protect survivors from this type of act by ensuring that their 
private lives are not subject to intensive public scrutiny. This protection works as a catalyst for 
encouraging survivors to report their victimization, to testify in the subsequent trial, while also 
ensuring that defendants retain the opportunity to present an adequate defense.211  Nevertheless, 
some rape shield laws preserve loopholes that allow juries to hear evidence of the survivor’s 
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character and habits.212 Despite this, individuals like Routh try to exploit the loopholes in these 
laws.  In an attempt to resolve this issue, the survivor’s attorney sent Routh the following 
statement: 
The threats contained in you[r] March 21, 2012 letter, to the effect 
that you will make public certain alleged sexual communications 
between yourself and our client, Ms. Hulbert, if she does not agree 
to participate in mediation, constitutes the crime of coercion under 
New York and quite possibly, federal laws. We intend on filing a 
criminal complaint as a result. 
We also intend on supplementing our various motions to apprise 
the court of this threat, and to broaden our motion for sanctions to 
include a claim against you. We will further supplement our 
motion to broaden the claim against your mother because, as you 
wrote, she encouraged and conspired with you to send the 
offending letter. 
 
You[r] letter threat is outrageous and among the most offensive 
litigation tactics that I have seen.  There is no place for this 
conduct in the Courts, and we shall seek redress.213 
 
Indeed, there is no place for threats and coercion in law, particularly when the case involves a 
survivor of sexual violence. Of course there is value in zealous legal representation, however, 
defendants in all cases should be free from having their past exploited without a reasonable 
reason for doing so.  
As a result of this notion, courts have been empowered to impose sanctions for malicious 
use of a defendant’s past and they should if it isn’t proven to be zealous legal representation.214 
Moreover, the court may not impose sanctions if there is some merit to the information that the 
plaintiff intends to offer as evidence.215 In this case, the court failed to sanction Routh even 
though he specifically threatened to file the amended complaint if they did not agree to 
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mediation. In reaching that decision, the court reasoned that the nature of the claim required a 
discussion of both party’s sexual activity. Therefore the information Routh intended to make 
public would be relevant and the motion for sanctions was denied.216  
 Although the nature of defamation cases and allegations of sexual violence have a 
foundation based on the sexual activity of the plaintiff and the defendant, there is no need to 
silence survivors by failing to protect their past from malicious disclosure. Likewise, the court’s 
inability to sanction an alleged perpetrator for intending to exploit a survivor’s past is a 
malicious act that should result in severe sanctions, regardless of the relative value of the 
information. Failure to do so will continue to contribute to unreported acts of sexual violence, 
which will continue to silence survivors and disrupt their journey to recovery. 
 
The Issue Between Public and Private Plaintiffs 
 
While there may be a privacy issue in defamation cases, there may also be an issue 
between two private citizens that has additionally become a matter of public concern. When a 
case involves a matter of public concern, plaintiff’s can recover a greater amount if the defendant 
is found liable.217 However, distinguishing between a private and a public matter is difficult to 
discern for some courts because cases involving sexual assault can be thought of as a private 
matter.218 In contrast, if the court finds the plaintiff to be a private person, the negligence 
standard will be applied.219 In these cases, the court looks to the elements of the claim to 
discover if certain elements were met. These elements include a “(1) a false and defamatory 
statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault 
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amounting to at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the 
statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm 
caused by the publication (defamation per quod).”220 
Public figures or private persons can bring claims for defamation. If a public figure 
brings a claim for defamation, the public figure must prove malice to recover damages.221 This is 
the case because some courts have found that “false statements of fact are particularly valueless, 
they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage 
to an individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive 
or effective.222  However, false statements of fact are thought of as inevitable in free debate and 
imposing liability upon a publisher would have an undoubted chilling effect on speech related to 
public figures.223 
Defendants in defamation cases attempt to assert that their statements were a matter of 
public concern, which would offer greater First Amendment protection to their statements. This 
would occur because the burden of proof would increase from a preponderance of the evidence 
to clear and convincing evidence.224 Although defendants assert this notion, courts have 
interpreted allegations of sexual violence to be matters “that are purely private in nature.”225 
Although an instance of sexual violence is a matter of private concern, that privacy remains with 
the alleged survivor as opposed to the alleged perpetrator. Nevertheless, courts have noted that 
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the “boundaries of public concern cannot be readily defined, but must be determined on a case-
by-case basis.”226   
 If courts were to embrace the notion that committing a crime of moral turpitude makes a 
person a public official they would find that predatory offender community notification laws 
would support the practice. Take for example the state of Minnesota’s predatory offender 
registration laws.227 These laws hold the idea that a person must register as a predatory offender 
if they are charged or convicted of a crime of sexual violence. At that point, the person’s status 
as a predatory offender has become a matter of public concern, for safety reasons, also making 
them a public official. Courts have been in opposition to the notion of alleged perpetrators being 
public officials by stating that:  
Defamatory statements were made by private non-media 
defendants about a private plaintiff.  These statements did not 
automatically become matters of public, as opposed to private, 
concern simply because plaintiff is a pilot for a commercial airline.  
There is no claim or evidence that plaintiff is an unsafe or less 
skilled pilot because he allegedly raped or attempted to rape 
women during off-duty hours.  Nor does the evidence support the 
conclusion that members of the flying public are in danger of being 
sexually assaulted by plaintiff.228 
 
The Court’s finding on this matter is interesting because individuals who are suspects in cases 
involving sexual violence impose a significant threat to society. As evident by the facts of Reedy 
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v. Evanson, perpetrators of sexual violence often commit similar acts after committing one 
sexual offense.229  
On one hand, perpetrators of sexual violence may continue to commit acts of sexual 
violence, therefore, citizens need to be notified of their behavior, which makes the alleged 
perpetrator’s behavior a matter of public concern and the alleged perpetrator a public figure. On 
the other hand, individuals who are the subject of false speech, specifically false allegations of 
sexual violence, are at a severe disadvantage because they are likely to gain the reputation of an 
actual perpetrator of sexual violence. This makes it difficult to navigate the continuum between 
public and private figures. Still, it is notable that courts have found alleged perpetrators of sexual 
violence to be limited-purpose public figures. For example, the Bay Circuit Court in Michigan 
found the defamation complainant to be a limited-purpose public figure.230 In these types of 
cases, finding the complainant to be a public figure will increase the burden of proof and protect 
survivors of sexual violence from arbitrary defamation claims. 
 
VI. CLOSING 
 
The impact of sexual violence can result in a number of damaging physical and 
psychological injuries to survivors. These injuries are long-standing and the journey to recovery 
can be very difficult if survivors do not have the freedom to discuss the offense, peacefully 
protest their attacker, retain their liberty, and be free from the unjustified disclosure of their 
privacy. Failing to address these issues through the interpretation of constitutional law, criminal 
                                                
229 Reedy, 615 F.3d at 209 (2010). (“Reedy's criminal trial was scheduled to begin on September 19, 
2005. On August 22, 2005, Wilbur Brown was apprehended while he was assaulting a female 
convenience store clerk in Brookville, Pennsylvania. Brown subsequently confessed to both the attack on 
Reedy and the Landmark attack. On September 1, 2005, the Butler County District Attorney dropped all 
charges against Reedy.”) 
230 Glowicki v. Swanson, No. 256574, 2006 WL 626234, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. March 14, 2006). 
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law, and civil law will continue to contribute to the low number of sexual assault reports and the 
lack of healthy recovery for survivors.  
In resolving these issues, schools attempting to impose constitutional free speech 
restrictions of survivors should formulate plans to reduce damaging interactions between 
survivors and alleged perpetrators if they both continue to attend classes and extracurricular 
activities. Furthermore, courts should interpret the recent legal precedent coming out of schools, 
which indicates that student speech should be restricted if it is disruptive, advocates illegal 
activity, is lewd or obscene, or it violates the privacy of other citizens. If these elements are 
present, then the speech should be restricted, however, if the student’s speech reflects the 
elements of Doe v. Silsbee, the court should allow the speech.   
When resolving the application of criminal law to survivors, the investigative process 
should be modified to empower survivors. For example, an increase in the use of victim 
advocates during the sexual assault investigation could help empower survivors of sexual 
violence throughout their battle in the justice system. Likewise, implementing training programs 
for law enforcement officers could reduce police hostility and reduce the number of arbitrary 
arrests for false reports of sexual violence and police misconduct. These changes could help 
dispel myths related to sexual violence, increase reporting, and lead to a healthy recovery for 
survivors who report the offense to law enforcement. 
Lastly, the alleged perpetrator’s malicious use of civil laws like defamation is a unique 
issue in crimes of sexual violence. These issues can be resolved by protecting the privacy of 
survivors from malicious disclosure through Rape Shield laws. Furthermore, if courts were to 
find previous perpetrators of sexual violence as public figures, it would increase the burden of 
proof in defamation cases and protect survivors from arbitrary defamation claims. These two 
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resolutions could minimize the damage done to true survivors of sexual violence while they are 
defending themselves in claim for defamation. 
